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Mitigating the Dark Side of  Agile Teams: Peer Pressure, Leaders’ 
Control, and the Innovative Output of  Agile Teams 
Abstract 
Increasingly, organizations have been employing self-managing teams to circumvent bureaucratic 
controls and stimulate innovation. However, this goal is not easily achieved; in many situations, 
informal controls replace formal controls. This study develops a multi-level perspective of control. 
We explicitly analyze control mechanisms at different levels of the organization and how they affect 
innovative team output. We theorize and empirically investigate a potential downside of horizontal 
social control mechanisms at the team level (i.e., peer pressure) affecting self-managing teams’ 
innovative outcomes. We also discuss managerial control mechanisms at the organizational level 
(i.e., interactive and diagnostic management control systems) that may help to mitigate such negative 
effects. We theorize how they may influence the innovative output of self-managing teams, both 
directly and interactively. We chose a multi-level, multi-source setting for our study and ran three 
parallel surveys with employees in a Fortune 500 firm. 248 team members, 126 internal team leaders, 
and 97 organizational leaders enabled us to create a unique database of 97 self-managing software 
development teams. Our findings confirm that peer pressure is common among established agile 
teams and that it negatively influences the innovative output of the agile teams. Moreover, our 
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at higher levels within the organization. This enables us to provide new theoretical insights regarding 
the paradoxical effect of managerial control systems when it comes to flat organizations and 
autonomous teams. Additionally, we provide practical guidelines for managers who increasingly 
adopt agile practices but at the same time face issues with regard to innovation. 
 
Practitioner Points 
 People working in self-managing teams, despite being empowered by autonomy, can often 
be constrained by accumulated peer pressure, leading to reduced team innovativeness. 
 Team managers can help improve overall team performance when team members are subject 
to peer pressure through two key interventions: target optimization & frequent interaction. 
 A focus on optimizing targets and outcomes is beneficial when peer pressure is high and has 
a potentially detrimental effect when peer pressure is low.  
 Frequent interaction and guidance on behalf of the manager also demonstrates an overall 
positive effect, but the effect is strongest when peer pressure is low. 
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Introduction 
Today’s organizations need to innovate (e.g., Doran and Ryan, 2016; Volberda et al., 2021) to 
survive increasingly dynamic environments, and teams often become the locus of innovation (e.g., 
Weiss, Backmann, Razinskas, and Hoegl, 2018). However, innovation does not come easily. 
Implementing creative ideas can be difficult (Baer, 2012), and many innovation projects remain 
incomplete (Todt, Weiss, and Hoegl, 2018; 2019). To stimulate innovative output, large firms 
increasingly reorganize themselves around self-managing work teams, such as agile teams (Cooper 
and Sommer, 2016; Grass, Backmann, and Hoegl, 2020). A self-managing team is a “group of 
individuals with diverse skills and knowledge with the collective autonomy and responsibility to plan, 
manage, and execute tasks interdependently to attain a common goal” (Magpili and Pazos, 2018: 4). 
By combining elements of an organic structure (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Volberda, 1996; Slater, 
Mohr, and Sengupta, 2014) with new and more indirect forms of control (Heydebrand, 1989; Sewell, 
1998), organizations aim to acquire more flexibility, creativity, and speed to overcome the inertia 
associated with bureaucratic control. 
 However, despite the increasing popularity of self-managing teams, they do not always 
deliver on promises to enhance teams’ innovative output; previous research shows that self-
managing teams do not always achieve high levels of innovativeness (Cardinal, 2001; Wegman, 
2001). This variation in the success of self-managing teams achieving innovative outcomes is likely 
explained by the organizational context in which such teams are embedded (Baer and Frese, 2003; 
Ahmadi et al., 2017), and important contributing factors include the roles of leaders and line 
managers (Kreutzer et al., 2015; Khanagha, Volberda, Oshri, 2017). Control systems, i.e., 
mechanisms to ensure alignment between employees’ capabilities, actions, and performance with 
organizational goals and aspirations (Sitkin, Cardinal, and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2010), are particularly 
important in this regard. They are associated with various managerial challenges, including those 
related to innovation (Coelho et al., 2020; Turner and Makhija, 2006). When combining social 
control exercised by team peers, understanding the effect of managerial control becomes more 
complex. Multi-level interactions between team-level dynamics and the wider organizational context 
are likely to influence teams’ general and innovative performances (cf. Magpili and Pazos, 2018; and 
Jansen, Kostopoulos, Mihalache, and Papalexandris, 2016). Specifically, this study sets out to reveal 
the paradoxical relationship between high team autonomy and managerial controls. While self-
managing teams may facilitate innovation, they can also bear unwanted side-effects, such as high 
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managerial control practices can stifle innovation in the same context, they can also counter the 
negative effects of high peer pressure by limiting destructive behaviors and regulating extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation. Previous research has largely overlooked multi-level implications of providing 
autonomy for teams. Several studies on internal regulations have explicitly called for multi-level 
conceptualization and analysis of interactions between organizational controls and team-level social 
dynamics (Long and Sitkin, 2018; Stewart et al., 2012). Such cross-level effects are particularly 
relevant when exceeding a routine-based performance outcome, focusing on prior research on 
organizational controls (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2015) and investigating the overlooked question 
(Siciliano, 2016) of how various control mechanisms affect creativity and innovativeness. 
 With this in mind, we build on the seminal work by Simons (1994) to identify key managerial 
control systems (interactive and diagnostic) and group level social controls (peer pressure), and we 
explore how these factors influence the innovative outcome of agile teams. This article aims to 
deepen our understanding regarding different manifestations of organizational control and how they 
interact with and affect the innovative performance of self-managing teams. First, by developing a 
multi-level perspective on the control of self-managing teams, we extend research on the 
implications of organizational controls (Cardinal et al., 2017; Long and Sitkin, 2018); we investigate 
how different types of team and organizational behavior can affect team innovation. Specifically, we 
propose that internal peer pressure, a potential consequence for self-managing teams, relates to a 
team’s overall ability to innovate. This relationship depends on the leader’s control behavior, 
particularly on the diagnostic and interactive controls implemented. By evaluating how the 
organizational-level control level influences the team-level internal regulation process, this article 
attempts to shed light on the tensions between external forces enacted through existing managerial 
control systems and internal forces exerted horizontally, i.e., by peers within self-managing teams. In 
this way, we aim to advance the idea that different control systems need to be considered in 
combination (e.g., Loughry and Tosi, 2008; Stewart et al., 2012). Second, we add to literature seeking 
to identify strategies for avoiding issues inhibiting innovation within teams (e.g., Todt, Weiss, and 
Hoegl, 2017). We do this by conceptualizing the management layer as moderating the effects of 
social influence within the self-managing team. This moderation ensures that the team’s activities 
align with the organization’s goals and strategy; we examine how managerial control may affect the 
teams’ innovative output, an area that has not yet been widely studied (Büschgens et al., 2013). We 
distinguish two types of controls, namely diagnostic and interactive controls (Simons, 1994). 
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and outcomes. Interactive controls, on the other hand, can be considered a more active form of 
control that is based on stimulating managers to communicate with the employees and to support 
them. We also consider innovative output as a performance outcome, thereby extending prior 
research (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2015) primarily focused on how general performance outcomes are 
affected by managerial controls. 
We develop five hypotheses and test the research model (Figure 1) with multi-level and 
multi-source data collected from 97 self-managed, agile research and development (R&D) teams and 
the various management layers in a large multinational corporation (MNC), a leader in the 
telecommunications industry. Like many information and communication technology organizations, 
the firm decided to move to agile software product development. While peer pressure emerges from 
interactions between team members, it is measured directly at the group level. To visually capture 
the process of emergence, we have included an additional level in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Theory development 
Self-managing teams and peer pressure 
Peer pressure can be a consequence of flatter management structures and increased worker 
autonomy (Tompkins and Cheney, 1985). Although self-managing teams might experience less 
bureaucratic control, they are not free from control because peer pressure can often develop. This 
kind of social pressure directs employees’ behavior toward accomplishing organizational objectives 
without relying on the bureaucratic hierarchy. Team members develop mechanisms “in concert” to 
control their activities (Tompkins and Cheney, 1985). By cooperating on common team tasks, team 
members establish norms for their activities. Initial norms, representing “correct” behavior, are the 
basis and formal instrument to exercise control (Jermier et al., 1991), leading to peer pressure 
developing within the team. 
Peer pressure can be understood as a team-level phenomenon, defined as a system of 
control exerted and perpetuated by workers, which involves micro-techniques of discipline for 
regulating and normalizing collective team action and the actions of individual employees. Peer 
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Hekman, 2016). Team members’ shared norms and values legitimize attempts to influence 
teammates’ behavior through verbal disapproval such as direct demands, open confrontation, or 
guilt-inducing comments (Druskat and Kayes 2000). While individual team members apply pressure, 
they act based on collective norms and the behalf of their team (De Jong, Bijlsma-Frankema, and 
Cardinal, 2014). The emergence of peer pressure is, therefore, a dynamic, interactive process. More 
specifically, following the definition of emergence by Kozlowski and Klein (2000), we consider peer 
pressure to be a bottom-up phenomenon, whereby individual characteristics and dynamic social 
interaction yield a higher-level group property. 
When employees work together to generate their own social rules, this can give rise to a 
feeling of collective empowerment (e.g., Sinclair, 1992; Barker, 1993). This refers to a belief that, to 
reach specific ends, an individual can influence other people or events in an organization or a group 
(Greenberger and Strasser, 1986; Kanter, 1977). However, in this kind of participative environment, 
individual autonomy, which allows the employee to decide when and how to perform a task 
(Hackman and Oldham, 1976), is likely to be overridden by pressures to conform to other team 
members’ expectations. Here autonomy becomes collective rather than individual (Herman, 1982), 
and the locus of control moves from the organizational management to team members, who 
cooperate by creating social rules and norms. These rules and norms then drive their behaviors, 
constituting the basis for meaning and sanctioning modes of social conduct (Barker, 1993). 
Through a process of internalization, which occurs when employees feel a sense of identity 
within the organizational value system, peer pressure becomes part of the “standard operating 
procedure.” Classification usually legitimizes uninterrupted individual domination inside the team 
(Greenblatt, 1986; Hacking, 1986). Classifying individuals as poor or good workers is relevant for 
determining which employees make active contributions, as expected by others, and sanctioning 
employees who do not (Foucault, 1980). Team members are evaluated against a norm or average, so 
rankings are constantly generated. Continuous surveillance, which normalizes behavior, is likely to 
help employees develop self-control and establish an organizational conscience (Merton, 1968; 
Presthus, 1962; Ruitenbeek, 1963, Whyte, 1956). 
Team innovation  
Organizations are increasingly reliant on teams developing innovative solutions. Entrepreneurial 
teams, new venture teams, R&D teams, new product development (NPD) teams, and science teams 
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these teams operate in different environments, experience contextual differences in risk level and 
uncertainty, and their responsibilities may vary, they all share the common goals of developing and 
implementing new products, processes, or solutions (Thayer, Petruzzelli, and McClurg, 2018). 
Due to its seemingly contradictory demands, team innovation is a complex, paradoxical 
process. ITs explore creative ideas and exploit existing knowledge so that creative solutions can be 
feasibly and usefully implemented (Bledow, Frese, Anderson, Erez, & Farr, 2009; March 1991). 
Consequently, team innovation is a multistage phenomenon consisting of idea generation and idea 
implementation, yet innovation moves dynamically and non-linear, not neatly between these stages 
(Bledow et al., 2009; Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996; West, 2002). Due to the strong element of creative 
problem solving involved with the innovation process, autonomy, a prerequisite for idea generation, 
has been a key characteristic of ITs (Zhou, 1998). Moreover, strong reliance on creativity has 
resulted in a multi-level view of team innovation, attributing the apparent complexity to cross-level 
differences in creativity requirements and complex interactions among the phenomena operating at a 
given level of analysis (e.g., Anderson, Potonik, and Zhou, 2014; Mumford and Hunter, 2005). As a 
result, different levels of antecedents have been proposed at the individual, job, group, and 
organizational levels of analysis, governed by a wealth of theoretical approaches (e.g., cognitive, 
motivational, entrepreneurship, leadership, networks, culture, and strategy). 
This study defines team innovation as the generation and implementation of novel and 
useful outcomes (Nijstad & De Dreu, 2002). We acknowledge that team creativity is a core element 
of team innovation; however, we emphasize generating creative ideas and putting them into action 
(Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009). Early emphasis is placed on exploration and divergent 
thinking, whereas in the second stage, the emphasis shifts to exploitation and convergent thinking 
(Liang, Shu, and Fahr, 2018). We also ground our approach on the assumption that, due to synergies 
from synthesizing different insights and perspectives, and the mutual stimulation of creative insights, 
team-based work is fundamental for innovation (van Knippenberg, 2017b; West & Farr, 1990). 
Peer pressure and innovative team output 
While a certain degree of peer control within a team may stimulate alertness and learning among 
team members, agile teams tend to have an average or above level of peer pressure. In other words, 
in agile teams, it is unlikely to observe extreme cases of low peer pressure and the related potential 
downsides. However, when peer pressure is high, innovative team output can be constrained in 
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Previous studies compared people with intrinsic motivation with those whose actions tend to be 
controlled externally. They found that individuals with intrinsic motivation engage more with tasks, 
show more interest in what they are doing, and are more confident; thus, they perform better and 
show greater persistence and creativity (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1991). Such individuals are more likely 
to take risks and remain focused on tasks for longer, and they also develop ideas or solutions for 
problems. However, individuals who feel pressured to think and behave in certain ways and whose 
behavior is monitored closely might have less intrinsic motivation. They may become less focused 
on team activities (Deci et al., 1989; Deci and Ryan, 1987). 
 Second, peer pressure implies that team members adhere to collective norms and rules, with 
violations resulting in various forms of sanctioning by the team. Consequently, for individuals within 
teams, a sense of introjection arises because they are driven by external regulation (Deci and Ryan, 
1985). Under such circumstances, individuals are not operating in response to explicit directives but 
are instead following the expectations of others. As a result, innovative outcomes will be 
discouraged, as they often require divergent thinking and behavior and intrinsic or extrinsic stimuli. 
Thus, we argue that peer pressure within a team will be significantly related to the team’s innovative 
output. 
Hypothesis 1: Team peer pressure will be negatively related to the innovative output of the team. 
Leaders’ control and their influence on innovative team output 
Peer pressure, in the form of scrutiny from other peer group members, acts as a form of horizontal 
surveillance; it is different from the vertical control achieved by monitoring the work performance 
of individuals and teams, enacted through the control systems and behavior of organizational 
leaders. The controls used by leaders are “formalized procedures and systems that use information 
to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities” (Simons, 1987, p. 358). Examples include 
planning systems, reporting systems, and monitoring procedures that rely on information use. 
Through reconciling organizational tensions between innovation and efficiency (Henri, 2006), 
leaders may use control to overcome organizational inertia and bring about both evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes in the firm (Simons, 1994). 
We focus on two distinct types of managerial control. First, one control system, closely 
related to management-by-exception, is diagnostic control systems (DCS) (Simons, 1991). These 
systems involve team goals formulated according to a given organizational vision and strategy and 
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distal goals, based on the continuous collection of team performance data, and allow different 
tolerance levels for discrepancies. Second, managers may adopt a more participative approach, such 
as intervening in daily organizational decisions; this is referred to as interactive control. Managers 
using this form of control “personally and regularly involve themselves in the decisions of 
subordinates” (Simons, 1991, p. 49). Interactive control systems are used when team managers 
and/or external stakeholders regularly stimulate dialogue and interaction with team members; this is 
done to influence the team members’ decisions and the impact of their work and ensure they are 
focusing on set objectives. 
Diagnostic control and innovative team output 
By imposing deadlines and providing feedback loops, diagnostic controls can act as “non-synergistic 
extrinsic motivators” (Amabile, 1993), meaning that they can never be positively associated with 
intrinsic motivation. Without any diagnosis, team members may lose focus and alignment with 
organizational goals. However, expert organizations often routinize such controls, and when 
exercised too frequently or strictly by managers, the controls may prove detrimental to an 
individual’s sense of self-determination. The feeling of being directed by powerful management does 
not build a sense of competence or a deep engagement with one’s work. A work environment that 
emphasizes extrinsic motivators without supporting intrinsic motivation will, over time, undermine 
any initial intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1993). Diagnostic Control Systems are tied to existing lines 
of authority and responsibility, and they undermine individual commitment to cross-functional 
processes (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). To achieve the highest level of creative and productive 
work, individuals performing complex tasks require a combination of intrinsic motivation and 
synergistic extrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1993). Diagnostic control can foster single-loop learning, 
but not the higher-level (double-loop) learning required to encourage innovative behavior (de Haas 
and Kleingeld, 1999). Also, the use of diagnostic control typically involves limited information flow 
and structured communication channels, while innovation relies on a free flow of information and 
open channels of communication (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). Additionally, Van Den Bosch et al. 
(1999) suggest that discussion initiated by using diagnostic control will, at best, lead to corrective 
action. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
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Interactive control and innovative team output 
According to Simons (1995), interactive control systems are used in contexts with constantly 
changing information that managers identify strategically important, requiring consistent attention to 
subordinates and being involved in their decisions. Interactive forms of control mean that data are 
better interpreted in face-to-face meetings between team members and managers, as this allows 
continuous debate and formulation of action plans. Interactive control systems are a tight form of 
control that provides a more open, informal, and subjective exchange of information (Chenhall, 
2005). In a context involving rapid, iterative developments, lacking appropriate information can 
cause difficulties in developing plans for products or services and create issues when making 
evaluations for changing demands. This suggests that interactive management control systems are 
needed to facilitate learning and adaptation and make decisions based on adjustable criteria 
dependent on changing conditions (Chenhall, 2005). Interactive control provides intellectual stimuli, 
which will be beneficial in generating new knowledge and understanding of relevant cause-and-effect 
relationships (Henri, 2006). By stimulating dialogue and debate and expediting information 
exchange, interactive control systems enable knowledge dissemination, communication and 
distribution of information, and the development of strategic initiatives (e.g., De Haas and 
Kleingeld, 1999; Simons, 1995). In this way, managers can help teams deal with conflicts arising 
between innovation and efficiency, hence supporting them to focus on creative activities beyond 
regular responsibilities (Bass and Avolio, 1994). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
  Hypothesis 3: Managerial Interactive control is positively related to innovative team output. 
Cross-level interactions between control mechanisms and innovative team output 
Information and feedback from managers make it easier for teams to set targets or goals, allowing 
them to determine how to make up performance deficits and adjust certain behaviors. When 
external feedback is received, it may provide a different and unexpected perspective, leading to 
comparisons between the team’s collective perception and a manager’s external view (Berg, 1985). 
When managers behave in ways supportive of a team’s goals and actions, they reinforce the team’s 
perceptions of the desired behavior in the organization (Bem, 1973). While diagnostic control may 
directly damage creative work, we expect it to dampen the negative effect of peer pressure on 
innovation. In innovative teams, this effect reveals the paradoxical relationship between high 
autonomy and managerial control. By diverting the focus toward regular activities and efficiency-
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innovation team. However, when peer pressure is high, managerial diagnostics may help a team 
recognize and resolve some detrimental consequences, such as destructive behavior and sanctioning 
against creative individuals. Therefore, we argue that while autonomy generally facilitates innovation, 
it can also bear high peer pressure. At the same time, while it has been shown to stifle innovation, 
managerial control can equalize cases of high peer pressure, dampening its negative effect. 
A manager frequently meeting and speaking with individuals, i.e., a participative approach, 
may help to create both the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations required for innovative behavior. 
Managers may provide an outsider view not necessarily aligned with the team’s shared norms and 
values. This may lead to ideas being encouraged or may help resolve tensions and problems standing 
in the way of innovation, for example, reserving time for individual development and teams 
accessing required expertise and resources. Thus, we expect both interactive and diagnostic 
approaches to help mitigate the negative effects of peer pressure on team innovative output. Hence 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Managerial diagnostic control weakens the negative effect of team peer pressure on innovative team 
output. 




Agile software development and scrum 
Agile software development departs from traditional, plan-based approaches to software engineering 
(Dybå & Dingsøyr, 2008) to emphasize lean processes and dynamic adaptation rather than detailed 
front-end plans and heavy documentation (Nerur & Balijepally 2007). It is typically used in settings 
where it is pivotally important to detect, identify, and respond to emerging user requirements (Beck 
& Andres, 2005; Schwaber & Beedle, 2002) with minimal formal processes (Cockburn, 2006). 
Agile principles, first discussed in the “Agile Manifesto” (Fowler & Highsmith, 2001), aim to 
create business value by delivering working software to users at regular short intervals. These 
principles have, in turn, spawned several practices built around two premises: a) self-organizing 
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productivity; and (b) the active participation of customers (or their surrogates) in the development 
process, facilitating feedback and reflection to ensure better results (Dingsøyr, Nerur, Balijepally, & 
Moe, 2012). 
“Scrum” is one of the most common agile methods (Dingsøyr et al., 2012). It emerged from 
the “NPD game,” a holistic approach to product development. Self-managing teams implement 
innovative products in “sprints,” i.e., short periods of two to four weeks, each starting with a 
planning session and ending with a review. Scrum consists of six principles: a) self-managing teams 
with high autonomy; b) very challenging goals; c) subtle control; d) overlapping development phases; 
e) multifunctional learning; f) organizational transfer of learning (Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986). In 
every team, the product owner (PO), i.e., a functional unit manager, determines the items that need 
development, which then get listed in the product backlog. The backlog always reflects the current 
knowledge of necessary tasks (Sutherland & Schwaber, 2007). During each sprint planning phase, 
team members select the top priority items from the product backlog and include them in the next 
sprint. Daily meetings coordinate the team’s work. On the other hand, the Scrum master, the 
equivalent of a project manager, is responsible for multiple things, perhaps most importantly, 
enacting the Scrum values and practices and resolving any issues preventing the team from working 
effectively. 
Participants and procedures 
We collected survey data from 97 R&D teams in a telecommunications MNC, including their 
internal team managers and their higher-level managers in 34 organizational units, located in 11 
different countries, including Canada (5), China (16), Croatia (12), Hungry (5), India (2), Ireland (13), 
Italy (1), Madrid (11), Poland (6), Sweden (25) and the United States (1). Data to develop reliable 
scales came from 44 exploratory interviews held over three months in the same MNC. To introduce 
the study and secure the involvement of employees and respective managers, one of the authors 
contacted the top manager in each of the units involved. The types and sizes of teams and the levels 
of task complexity were very similar in all the organizational units. Most teams in the study were 
developing new products to implement new software functionalities. Some of them (9%) were 
working on software maintenance, undertaking vast activities, including optimization, error 
correction, deletion of discarded features, and enhancement of existing features. Both types of teams 
had similar responsibilities and issues concerning innovation and agile initiatives. The average team 
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for an approximate average of 1.5 years. Our study defined a team as a group of people who: 1) 
worked together permanently; 2) reported directly to the same supervisor and group of stakeholders; 
3) were coordinated by the same internal team coordinator (Scrum master); 4) recognized 
themselves as belonging to a team with a unique identifier (i.e., the team’s name). Without exception, 
team members interacted at least once a day during stand-up meetings and/or while completing 
tasks. Team coordinators were often present to monitor the team’s activities at those meetings. To 
reduce potential common method bias, we gathered data from three different sources. Team 
members reported on team peer pressure, the team’s internal leaders, the team size and age, and 
their organizational managers reported on diagnostic and interactive controls and innovative team 
output. All respondents were repeatedly encouraged to participate; we reminded them that a high 
response rate would increase the reliability of results, which would help their organization. Of the 
1,441 questionnaires sent out to team members across 226 teams, we received 726 responses relating 
to 140 teams (50% response rate). After cleaning the data and assessing inter-rater reliability, 
retaining only teams where at least two members responded, we obtained a final sample for the 
analysis made up of 248 team members, 126 teams, and 126 internal team coordinators (Scrum 
masters). Finally, we conducted a third survey among unit-level team managers one month later; we 
sent several reminders to these individuals until we received 97 complete responses. We used this 
time lag to avoid potential issues arising from a concurrent measurement of independent and 
dependent variables. 
Measures 
The surveys were in English, the common language used in the company. Some of the items in our 
survey came from previous research. In some cases, we adapted them slightly to the team context. 
We used seminal and recent work to develop and validate scales for team-level interactive and 
diagnostic controls. The surveys were tested in a pilot study on 23 team members and managers 
across different sites; we asked them to complete the survey and comment on any ambiguity in the 
questions. We held individual follow-up interviews to collect feedback and suggestions for 
improving the questionnaire, which we used to revise some items. 
Team peer pressure. We used three items from Wright and Barker’s (2000) scale to measure 
peer pressure. This scale represents the first psychological measure used to validate the manifest 
dynamics of peer pressure, as reported by Barker (1993). The selected items are meant to capture the 
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within a team due to team norms. Specifically, we asked team members to respond to the following 
items: (a) “My team makes sure that everyone in the team pulls his/her weight,” (b) “Within my 
team, we need the agreement of everyone in the team to decide how to use my working time,” and 
(c) “Within my team, we usually check with other team members before doing something that might 
affect them.” 
We assessed team peer pressure and all the team member survey variables on a seven-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 for “strongly disagree” to 7 for “strongly agree.” 
 Interactive and diagnostic controls. We used a systematic approach for scale development, 
following the steps recommended by seminal references (Hinkin, 1995; Rossiter, 2002). Based on 
Simons’s (1991, 1994) original work and transcripts of interviews with team members and others in 
the organization, we started by determining a theoretical basis for scale items. We subsequently 
explored other sources of information, including organizational documentation on the way teams 
worked, and then created a tentative list of survey items. This resulted in 10 items (5 for each 
moderator variable). We conducted in-depth interviews with three leaders to check any ambiguity in 
the item formulation and to suggest improvements to the questions. Of the 10 items, 2 were 
dropped (1 per variable) due to perceived ambiguity. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis to 
verify these measures’ reliability and internal consistency, and a two-factor structure for the 8 items 
was confirmed (explaining 78.24% of the variance). The factor loadings ranged from 0.788 to 0.923, 
which is above the acceptable threshold. Higher-level managers were asked to answer the following 
four items using a Likert-type scale (from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”). The 
items used to measure the interactive control were: 
 “I ensure that learning about our products is an important agenda to discuss inside my team 
or teams” 
 “I ensure that product innovation is a regular focus of attention for all the team members 
within my team(s)” 
 “I participate in all the team’s ceremonies and events” 
 “I continuously challenge and debate team’s work progress data or their action plans.” 
Diagnostic control was measured using the following items: 
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 “I regularly see information about the team’s progress in the achievement of their 
competence goals or learning objectives” 
 “Competence goals are regularly (at least twice a year) provided to my team.” 
The questions about managerial controls were not inherently positive or negative. Thus, 
there was no strong reason to believe that managers may try to ascribe unrepresentative behavior to 
themselves. Nonetheless, to ensure reliability and test the validity of our measurements, we added 
one question from each leadership control scale to the Scrum masters’ survey. The correlation 
between the two measures was high (r=0.64 for Diagnostic Control and r=0.58 for Interactive Control, 
p<0.001), providing additional assurance regarding the credibility of our measurement. 
 Team innovative output. Higher-level managers assessed the innovative output of their teams 
using a scale ranging from “very low” (1) to “very high” (7), using items closely related to those used 
in the company’s internal appraisal system. To ensure the validity and reliability of our measurement, 
we used several measures before, during, and after our survey. Before launching, to increase the face 
validity of our survey, we interacted extensively with the company to avoid defensiveness or 
withdrawal by the respondents (Johnson and Saboe, 2011). We avoided abstract or fully qualitative 
assessments and rather had managers evaluate innovation performance based on tangible, unbiased, 
and standardized elements (reflecting internal appraisal systems). The items rated in this way were: 
patents or the number of ideas generated for new features or new system improvements; new ideas 
generated for improving the team’s way of working; new ideas generated for minor improvements to 
existing products; use of new practices, new tools, or ways of working; the implementation of 
radical/major new product ideas. Ensuring correspondence between our scales and internal  
measures enabled us to capture variation in performance across the teams without neglecting 
complex commercial issues, HR problems, technological concerns, or other issues that could 
influence the teams’ innovation output and are difficult to control due to the company’s 
confidentiality concerns. During the survey, we interacted with managers through internal 
communication channels, and we ensured that there was a common understanding of the survey 
questions. After the survey, to further assess the reliability of our measurement, we secured access to 
an idea box and checked the correlation between the innovation performance reported by managers 
and the number of ideas submitted by teams. Not all the teams in our study used an idea box. More 
importantly, since it was operationalized, it did not cover all instances of innovation. However, there 
was a strong correlation between two measures (r=0.61, p<0.001) in the sample that we used (34 
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innovative output have unique aspects, a change in a latent variable may not cause simultaneous 
variation in all measures (Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003). Hence, different dimensions of 
innovative output can be considered indices produced by observable variables and are, therefore, 
formatively measured. 
Control variables. Previous research shows that team processes and outcomes can be strongly 
affected by the group’s composition (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Group size and team tenure are 
central among team composition variables and influence group processes and outcomes (e.g., 
Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 1989). We used these variables as control variables 
in our regression models. The group size was obtained from the internal team managers and 
evaluated as the number of team members. We assessed team age as the current team’s years of 
experience; this came from the internal team manager’s survey. 
Aggregation and measurement analysis 
The mean inter-rater agreement values for team-level constructs in this article, i.e., peer pressure (r = 
0.78), exceeded the generally accepted cut-off point of 0.70 for substantial inter-rater agreement 
(range: 0.67–0.86). To complement these statistics, we also estimated group-size-corrected and intra-
class correlation coefficients (ICCs). This procedure yielded acceptable intra-class correlations for 
the construct (0.72) and significant F-tests (p < 0.001), confirming the appropriateness of 
aggregating individual-level data to the team level. We assessed our multi-item measures’ convergent 
and discriminant validity with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the team-level data. The 
measurement model included three latent variables constructed by calculating the means for their 
underlying constructs: peer pressure, diagnostic control, and interactive control. The CFA yielded a 
non-significant chi-square and a good fit to the data (CFI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.053). Reliability 
analyses of our multi-item measures yielded satisfactory Cronbach alpha coefficients (0.73 ≤ α ≤ 
0.95). Together, these results support the validity and reliability of our measures. 
Results 
Table 1 shows means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the key variables 
of our study across two levels. Table 2 illustrates the results of the multi-level regression model for 
the outcome variable, i.e., the innovative output of teams. The models indicate a good level of fit 
and give, more or less, similar results in terms of this study’s different focal variables. The team-level 
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------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The effects of the two unit-level constructs, i.e., interactive control and diagnostic control, 
are both significant and in the expected directions in Model 4. The model confirms that interactive 
control is positively related to innovative output (β= 2.80), and the relationship is statistically 
significant, supporting hypothesis 3. Diagnostic control is negatively related to the innovative output 
of the teams (β= −3.08), and the relationship is statistically significant. However, because diagnostic 
control is not significant in Model 3, this interpretation needs further scrutiny. Because the final 
model is the strongest in terms of Χ2 value and the moderation chart suggests opposing forces that 
may cancel each other without considering interaction effects, we conclude that hypothesis 2 is 
supported. The interaction effects of managerial controls and peer pressure are significant: Figures 2 
and 3 illustrate these relationships. In interactive control, the figure shows that an increased level of 
peer pressure negates the control’s potential benefits. Conversely, higher levels of diagnostic control 
seem to be influential when there is greater peer pressure. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figures 2 & 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
Our study focused on a potential dark side of agile teams and asked how leaders might deal 
with this. We theorized and found that increased peer pressure to conform is a potential innovation 
inhibitor. We then identified managerial diagnostic and interactive controls as organizational-level 
factors that could mitigate or exacerbate this inhibitor. Our results suggest that peer pressure, 
focused on delivering and meeting deadlines, is linked to lower innovative team output. By 
illustrating how peer pressure is not beneficial for innovative team output when teams are working 
on high-intensity R&D activities, this finding contributes to research on normative mechanisms. The 
study underlines the importance of peer pressure as a motivational state in self-managing teams. We 
also show that managerial diagnostic and interactive controls moderate the relationship between 
peer pressure and team innovation. Diagnostic controls positively affect innovative output when 
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controls also demonstrate an overall positive effect, but the effect is strongest when peer pressure is 
low. Specifically, this work is a first attempt at studying the multi-level performance effects of 
diagnostic and interactive controls and how they interact with the more commonly studied 
normative mechanism of peer pressure. 
Questions about how various controls can and should be applied have attracted significant 
scholarly attention. Our study adds to existing research on control dynamics within organizations, 
for example, between managers and subordinates (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2017; see Long and Sitkin, 
2018). Our results suggest that, depending on the level of peer pressure within a team, management 
control can foster innovative output and is important in the context of self-managing teams. By 
using interactive control to focus on strategic priorities, such as learning and innovation, managers 
can help to improve the team’s innovative output. These results can be extended to the team level 
and complement empirical work undertaken by Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and Bisbe and Otley 
(2004), which indicate the role of control in the context of innovation. 
This study also shows that because team members feel constrained by the need to meet 
deadlines, diagnostic control negatively affects a team’s capacity for innovation. This is in line with 
theoretical arguments supporting the notion that both complementarity and competition exist 
between diagnostic and interactive controls, giving validity to including both types of control in 
theoretical and empirical analyses. The results indicate that managerial diagnostic and interactive 
controls both contribute to a team’s innovation capabilities. 
Our results also clarify the nature of the relationship between managerial interventions 
(through diagnostic and interactive control) and the normative mechanism of peer pressure. In 
innovative team output, diagnostic controls essentially help reduce the negative effects of peer 
pressure; interactive controls also reduces the negative effects, but to a lesser extent. Thus, 
consistent with our expectations, the effect of peer pressure on innovative output attenuates as 
diagnostic control increases. However, the effect is not strong enough that a high level of diagnostic 
control substitutes entirely for the effect of increased peer pressure. 
With these results, we can extend prior research on the determinants of innovation in self-
managing teams in several important ways. The study examined how management control systems 
determine innovative output in the context of self-managing teams. Overall, the findings indicate 
that with lower peer pressure, interactive managerial control makes a positive contribution to the 
innovative output of a team; however, diagnostic control does the opposite. When peer pressure is 
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challenges. This study adds to current research on managerial controls by proposing a theoretical 
framework that offers insights into the role of controls in implementing organizational strategies at 
the team level. The study helps better understand the complexity of multiple controls characterizing 
workers who support firms in achieving their organizational goals in the post-bureaucratic era. It 
also empirically tests the model proposed by Simons (1995), confirming that control systems are 
tools used in implementing strategies, giving rise to the emergence of new strategies. However, the 
study extends the Simons model by introducing a new unit of analysis: managerial control in teams. 
In contrast to that model, where it was unclear how leaders’ control could be combined with 
autonomous, social mechanisms, this study shows how leaders may use control to secure and extend 
the positive effects of self-managing teams, helping them become or remain more innovative. 
Past research has recognized that multiple controls may be used concurrently in teams, but 
the effect on team performance has not been considered (Barker, 1993). Previous studies 
investigated the nature of impact without considering different controls’ interdependent or joint 
effects (Henderson and Lee, 1992). Our study demonstrates that controls can complement each 
other or interact so that when used in combination, the impact on a team’s innovative capabilities is 
stronger than when any form is used alone. We do not suggest, as traditional control theory would 
indicate, that controls can only be used as replacements for one another (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 
2003). Complementarity and interactions between different controls depend on each control’s 
specific nature and how they influence a predetermined outcome, both independently and jointly. 
Our findings on the relationship between managerial controls, both diagnostic and interactive, and 
peer pressure offer scope to extend the theory on organizational control. We provide a more 
comprehensive theoretical understanding of how different controls, formal and informal, combine 
and interact to influence team capabilities. Even though earlier current control theory provided 
insights into the different types of control mechanisms used by organizations, there is still no clear 
understanding of the specific working processes (Loughry and Tosi, 2008; Stewart et al., 2012), 
interrelationships between the controls, and their impacts on teams. Because it elicits the conditions 
needed for control mechanisms to interact with each other, theorizing about control interactions 
offers a holistic understanding of the phenomenon (Bendersky, 2003; Chadwick, 2010). 
Our research draws on organizational control theory (Cardinal, 2001; Long et al., 2011; 
Sitkin et al., 2010) to explain team-level dynamics and outcomes. Cardinal and Kreutzer (2013) argue 
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such as peer pressure, pays no attention to specific controls that managers and team members can 
use to mitigate its effects. Understanding how organizations handle both formal and informal 
control systems requires a deep understanding of the mechanisms available to managers and what 
implications their use might have for team capabilities. Our work explores these issues in some 
depth by looking at the effects of using diagnostic and interactive controls both separately and in 
combination. Several scholars claim that formal controls are becoming less important due to the 
increasing team-based and knowledge-based work (Hagel et al., 2010; Kirsch et al., 2010; Kreutzer et 
al., 2014) that this creates a need to understand better how informal controls work. Our theorizing 
on the complementary use of controls reveals a set of criteria that managers could potentially use to 
reduce the negative effects of peer pressure. 
Our findings support the notion that team peer pressure is a motivational state that can 
undermine the team’s innovative output. It confirms the hypothesis put forward by Barker and 
Tompkins (1994) that as peer pressure (which Barker referred to as concertive control) becomes 
stronger, a team can reach the point of diminishing returns. When there is a high level of peer 
pressure, team members have to surrender too much of their identity for the team’s sake, which has 
a detrimental effect on motivation. Our focus on informal team-related factors, such as peer 
pressure, provides a more finely-grained understanding of how peer pressure affects a team’s 
innovative abilities. This confirms the usefulness of Wright and Barker’s (2000) scale in a different 
setting than Hilgermann (1998), who applied the construct both in a service organization and with 
manufacturing workers. Hilgermann found a positive relationship between the extent of peer 
pressure in the team environment and team outcomes, such as job satisfaction and effectiveness. 
This is in line with Henderson and Lee’s (1992) results, which, although exploratory, show that, in 
the context of design teams, team members’ control positively affects team performance. The 
contrast with our observations underlines the need to explore peer pressure mechanisms further to 
reconcile these different results. In addition, to increase the generalizability of these findings, the 
effect that tasks have on teams’ control behavior should be investigated. For example, our case 
included teams employed in highly complex R&D activities requiring a specific level of learning. 
Previous studies investigated how other forces exerted by peers affect team performance (Stewart et 
al., 2012). However, despite its increasing importance in modern organizations, few studies have 
explored the influence of peer pressure. More research is needed to fully understand the joint 
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peer-based normative mechanisms and rational control mechanisms in the context of self-managing 
teams. 
Limitations and future research 
While the methodology employed had several strengths, such as its use of multi-level data and 
multiple sources, it could be improved by using longitudinal data, which could more clearly 
determine the direction of causality. Nevertheless, since our hypotheses were driven by theory and 
the team members were assigned to their team from the organization, we can argue that these issues 
do not significantly impact the interpretation of the results. However, future research should use a 
longitudinal study or experimental design to establish the direction of causality. Findings from 
longitudinal datasets could improve the internal validity of our results by providing time-lagged data. 
Moreover, assuring that cross-level direct parameters represent the theoretical cross-level effects, a 
high degree of within-group agreement is essential (LoPilato & Vandenberg, 2015). While our 
analysis presents a satisfactory level of within-group agreement, future studies may consider settings 
that incorporate input from all team members, hence providing an even higher level of confidence 
in interpreting cross-level direct effects. Finally, our data were gathered in a single organizational 
context, the selected MNC. The study should be replicated using samples from different 
organizations to check whether the findings are generalizable to other settings. 
Practical implications 
Managers and team leaders attempting to introduce a flatter, more decentralized structure involving 
self-managing teams must encourage their teams and the entire organization to achieve higher 
performance and continue working toward the strategic goals set by the organization (Alexiou, 
Khanagha, Schippers, 2017). In our previous research regarding self-managing teams in complex 
R&D environments, and throughout the present study, we frequently observed inefficiencies, poorly 
coordinated efforts, and frustration from stakeholders. Innovation management literature pays little 
attention to issues, such as how managers should intervene and steer their teams toward higher 
levels of innovation. The results of this study suggest that when there is no peer pressure within a 
team, the dynamic tension generated from using both diagnostic and interactive controls can 
positively affect team innovation. This study provides a better understanding of how people working 
in self-managing teams, despite being empowered by autonomy, can often be constrained by 
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this study suggests various interventions to help improve overall team performance when team 
members are subject to peer pressure. In particular, our findings indicate that in teams with a high 
level of peer pressure, managers should ensure that team members keep a healthy focus on 
innovation and avoid excessive focus on routine, short-term-oriented tasks. 
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Figure 1: Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
TABLE 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATIONS 
 n Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Team Age (years) 97 1.5 0.450       
(2) Team Size (fte) 97 6.932 1.754 0.037      
(3) Team Structure 97 5.480 0.932 0.083 -0.104     
(4) Peer Pressure 97 5.016 0.973 0.150 -0.089 0.623*    
(5) Team Innovative output 97 4.343 1.363 0.147  0.103  0.032 -0.018   
(6) Diagnostic Control 34 5.780 1.029 -0.207 0.143 0.161 0.064 -0.008  
(7) Interactive Control 34 5.710 0.879 0.002 -0.005 0.278 0.163 0.285 0.369* 
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TABLE 2: RESULTS OF HLM ANALYSIS OF TEAM INNOVATIVE OUTCOME 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Β (s.e.) t p Β (s.e.) t p Β (s.e.) t p Β (s.e.) t p 
Intercept 4.41 (0.13) 32.97 0.00 4.06 (0.98)  4.16 0.00  1.64 (1.31) 1.25 0.21 10.31 (4.32) 2.39 0.02 
Team-level (Level 1)  
            
Team Age     0.24 (0.09)  2.70 0.01  0.23 (0.08) 2.81 0.00  0.32 (0.77) 4.12 0.00 
Team Size     0.17 (0.17)  1.02 0.31  0.10 (0.17) 0.63 0.52  0.20 (0.15) 0.13 0.90 
Team Structure     0.12 (0.14)  0.83 0.41  0.10 (0.13) 0.70 0.49  0.20 (0.13) 1.53 0.13 
Peer Pressure (PP)    -0.28 (0.15) -1.84 0.06 -0.31(0.15) -2.11 0.03 -2.24 (0.85) -2.63 0.01 
Unit-level (Level 2)  
            
Interactive Control (IC)       0.42 (0.17) 2.50 0.01  1.77 (0.63) 2.80 0.00 
Diagnostic Control (DC)       0.09 (0.15) 0.58 0.57 -2.67 (0.87) -3.08 0.00 
Cross-level interaction effects 
         -0.27 (0.12) -2.20 0.03 
PP × IC           0.56 (0.17) 3.26 0.00 
PP × DC             
             
Χ2 .  .  9.74  0.04 17.58  0.01 32.28 0.00  
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Figure 2: Peer pressure by Interactive control on Innovative output 
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